Philosophy of Science 33 (1/2):124- (1966)

Recent developments in social science methods have made most of the objectivism-subjectivism arguments in the philosophy of social science obsolete. Developments in experimental methods have made possible a behavioristic treatment of everything cherished as important in human action by the subjectivists; developments in computer and mathematical models have made possible a type of theory which carries out the program of the subjectivists but is not vulnerable to the arguments of the objectivists. What remains of the philosophical argument are two types of theory (for example, game theory and learning theory) which are both useful, both scientific, and frequently equivalent. Choice between them by scientists can be made on empirical grounds rather than on the grounds developed in the philosophical controversy
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DOI 10.1086/288081
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Science and human behavior.B. F. Skinner - 1954 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 144:268-269.
A Study of Thinking.Jerome S. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow & George A. Austin - 1958 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (1):118-119.
Operationism and Theory in Psychology.G. Bergmann & K. W. Spence - 1941 - Psychological Review 48 (1):1-14.

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