Researchreport

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present two kinds of analogical representational change, both occurring early in the analogy-making process, and then, using these two kinds of change, to present a model unifying one sort of analogy-making and categorization. The proposed uni- fication rests on three key claims: (1) a certain type of rapid representational abstraction is crucial to making the relevant analogies (this is the first kind of representational change; a computer model is presented that demonstrates this kind of abstraction), (2) rapid abstractions are induced by retrieval across large psychological distances, and (3) both categorizations and analogies supply understandings of perceptual input via construing, which is a proposed type of categorization (this is the second kind of representational change). It is construing that finalizes the unification.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,781
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Perception, Generality, and Reasons.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 131--57.
Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science: Reasoning by Analogy in Theory Construction.Lindley Darden - 1982 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:147 - 165.
Motor Intentionality and its Primordiality.Jennifer Hudin - 2006 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):573 – 590.
Added to PP index
2011-03-06

Total downloads
21 ( #245,189 of 2,198,883 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #299,438 of 2,198,883 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature