Role of the Frame Problem in Fodor's Modularity Thesis

In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited (1996)
Abstract
It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
Keywords Frame Problem  Computationalism  Modularity Thesis
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Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance.Richard Samuels - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.

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