In Ken Ford & Zenon Pylyshyn (eds.), The Robot's Dilemma Revisited (1996)

Authors
Eric Dietrich
State University of New York at Binghamton
Abstract
It is shown that the Fodor's interpretation of the frame problem is the central indication that his version of the Modularity Thesis is incompatible with computationalism. Since computationalism is far more plausible than this thesis, the latter should be rejected.
Keywords Frame Problem  Computationalism  Modularity Thesis
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References found in this work BETA

The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.
Brainstorms.Daniel Dennett - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 47 (2):326-327.
Precis of the Modularity of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (1):1-42.

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Citations of this work BETA

Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance.Richard Samuels - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.
The Frame Problem: An AI Fairy Tale. [REVIEW]Kevin B. Korb - 1998 - Minds and Machines 8 (3):317-351.
Culture, Cognitive Pluralism and Rationality.Colin W. Evers - 2007 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 39 (4):364–382.

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