The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory


Authors
Christian List
London School of Economics
Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abstract
How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Probabilistic opinion pooling  Credence aggregation  Propositional attitudes and their aggregation  Social choice theory  Formal social epistemology
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Reprint years 2008, 2010
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References found in this work BETA

Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
On Social Facts.Michael Root - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):675.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.

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Citations of this work BETA

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In A. Hajek & C. Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes.Daniele Porello - 2018 - Fundamenta Infromaticae 158 (1-3):239-27.

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