The aggregation of propositional attitudes: Towards a general theory

Abstract
How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. Our first theorem simultaneously characterizes some prominent aggregation rules in the cases of probability, judgment and preference aggregation, including linear opinion pooling and Arrovian dictatorships. Our second theorem abstracts even further from the specific kinds of attitudes in question and describes the properties of a large class of aggregation rules applicable to a variety of belief-like attitudes. Our approach integrates some previously disconnected areas of investigation.
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Probabilistic opinion pooling  Credence aggregation  Propositional attitudes and their aggregation  Social choice theory  Formal social epistemology
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Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (9):1601-1622.
A Puzzle About Belief Updating.Carlo Martini - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3149-3160.
Judgment Aggregation.Fabrizio Cariani - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):22-32.

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