Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294 (2004)
I begin by brieﬂy mentioning two different logical fatalistic argument types: one from temporal necessity, and one from antecedent truth value. It is commonly thought that the latter of these involves a simple modal fallacy and is easily refuted, and that the former poses the real threat to an open future. I question the conventional wisdom regarding these argument types, and present an analysis of temporal necessity that suggests the anti-fatalist might be better off shifting her argumentative strategy. Speciﬁcally, two points of interest emerge from my analysis: ﬁrst, temporal necessity turns out to be an inappropriate and ineffective tool for the fatalist to make use of; and, second, the dismissal of the argument from antecedent truth value turns out to be an over-hasty one.
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Logical Determinateness, Fixity, and the Symmetry of Time.Joseph Diekemper - 2005 - Philosophical Papers 34 (1):1-24.
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