The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models

Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218 (2013)

Authors
Martin Peterson
Texas A&M University
Abstract
We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only “secondary values” that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are neither value-free, nor depend exclusively on epistemic values or use non-epistemic values as tie-breakers
Keywords Epistemic values  Non-epistemic values  Engineering models  Value-judgments  Application of science
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9300-4
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 45,545
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):287-297.
Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism.Mauricio Suárez - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):225-244.

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Modelling Beyond Application: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Modern Science.Ekaterina Svetlova - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):79-98.
Modeling for Fairness: A Rawlsian Approach.Sven Diekmann & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:46-53.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Value of Cognitive Values.Heather Douglas - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (5):796-806.
Inductive Risk and Values in Science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
On Values in Science: Is the Epistemic/Non-Epistemic Distinction Useful?Phyllis Rooney - 1992 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:13-22.
Values in Pure and Applied Science.Sven Ove Hansson - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (3):257-268.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
Won't You Please Unite? Darwinism, Cultural Evolution and Kinds of Synthesis.Maria Kronfeldner - 2010 - In A. Barahona, H.-J. Rheinberger & E. Suarez-Diaz (eds.), The Hereditary Hourglass: Genetics and Epigenetics, 1868-2000. Max Planck Insititute for the History of Science. pp. 111-125.
Epistemic Goals and Epistemic Values.Stephen R. Grimm - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):725-744.
Expressivism and Convention-Relativism About Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - forthcoming - In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-08-06

Total views
69 ( #125,057 of 2,280,516 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #565,661 of 2,280,516 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature