The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Engineering Models

Science and Engineering Ethics 19 (1):207-218 (2013)
Abstract
We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only “secondary values” that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are neither value-free, nor depend exclusively on epistemic values or use non-epistemic values as tie-breakers
Keywords Epistemic values  Non-epistemic values  Engineering models  Value-judgments  Application of science
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DOI 10.1007/s11948-011-9300-4
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References found in this work BETA
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
Scientific Representation: Against Similarity and Isomorphism.Mauricio Suarez - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3):225-244.
Epistemic Values and the Argument From Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (1):14-34.
The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.Richard Rudner - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6.

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Citations of this work BETA
Modelling Beyond Application: Epistemic and Non-Epistemic Values in Modern Science.Ekaterina Svetlova - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):79-98.
Modeling for Fairness: A Rawlsian Approach.Sven Diekmann & Sjoerd D. Zwart - 2014 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 46:46-53.

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