Why Does Laudan’s Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail?

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):393 - 403 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In his paper "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan's criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon's statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that (approximate) truth is the best explanation for such success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful (approximately) true theories and cases of successful false theories

Similar books and articles

Approximate truth and scientific realism.Thomas Weston - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):53-74.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
In defense of convergent realism.Clyde L. Hardin & Alexander Rosenberg - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):604-615.
Coherence of Our Best Scientific Theories.Seungbae Park - 2011 - Foundations of Science 16 (1):21-30.
Reference invariance and truthlikeness.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):546-554.
Testing for convergent realism.Jerrold L. Aronson - 1989 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (2):255-259.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,660 (#5,168)

6 months
202 (#10,044)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Antonio Diéguez
University of Málaga

Citations of this work

El debate epistemológico sobre el realismo convergente.Damián Islas Mondragón - 2010 - Daimon: Revista de Filosofia Supplemento 3:311-320.

Add more citations