Authors
Antonio Diéguez
Universidad de Málaga
Abstract
In his paper "A Confutation of Convergent Realism", Larry Laudan offered one of the most powerful criticisms of scientific realism. I defend here that although Laudan's criticism is right, this does not refute the realist position. The thesis that Laudan confutes is a much stronger thesis than realist needs to maintain. As I will exemplify with Salmon's statistical-relevance model, a less strict notion of explanation would allow us to claim that truth is the best explanation for such success, even if it is accepted that there can be cases of unsuccessful true theories and cases of successful false theories.
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DOI 10.1007/s10838-006-9021-6
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning and the Moral Sciences.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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Citations of this work BETA

El debate epistemológico sobre el realismo convergente.Damián Islas Mondragón - 2010 - Daimon: Revista de Filosofia Supplemento 3:311-320.

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