Theoria 72 (4):299-318 (2006)

Authors
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
Abstract
What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a _conforming _belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be _red _to oneself--rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. On such a Cartesian view, our introspective certainly about our own thoughts extends also to our perceptual experiences as to how things seem to be to us, so that our resulting introspective beliefs about our phenomenal states also count as knowledge of them.
Keywords perceptual belief  perceptual experience  dispositions  functional consonance  introspection
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2006.tb00967.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Conscious Perceptual Experience as Representational Self-Prompting.John Dilworth - 2007 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):135-156.
More on the Interactive Indexing Semantic Theory.John Dilworth - 2010 - Minds and Machines 20 (3):455-474.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Disjunctive Theory of Perception.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 edition).
The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox.Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
Concerning Introspective "Knowledge".Thomas Natsoulas - 1970 - Psychological Bulletin 73 (2):89-111.
Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks.Jack Lyons - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Is Imagination Introspective?Kevin Reuter - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):31-38.
Mary Mary, Au Contraire: Reply to Raffman.George Graham & Terence Horgan - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):203-212.
Phenomenal Variability and Introspective Reliability.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (3):261-286.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
443 ( #18,971 of 2,455,634 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #54,459 of 2,455,634 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes