Philo 9 (1):12-31 (2006)

Authors
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
Abstract
In a previous Philo article, it was shown how properties could be ontologically dispensed with via a representational analysis: to be an X is to comprehensively represent all the properties of an X. The current paper extends that representationalist (RT) theory by explaining representation itself in parallel epistemic rather than ontological terms. On this extended RT (ERT) theory, representations of X, as well as the real X, both may be identified as providing information about X, whether partial or comprehensive. But that information does not match ontological, property-based analyses of X, so it is epistemically fundamental–hence supporting a broadly conceptualist rather than nominalist metaphysics.
Keywords Representation  Epistemic Identification  Conceptualism
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ISBN(s) 1098-3570
DOI 10.5840/philo2006912
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References found in this work BETA

Biosemantics.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (July):281-97.
Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 281--297.
Supervenience and Object-Dependant Properties.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):5-32.
Representation and Indication.Robert C. Cummins & Pierre Poirier - 2004 - In Hugh Clapin (ed.), Representation in Mind. Elsevier. pp. 21--40.

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