Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content

Abstract
Representationalists who hold that phenomenal character can be explained in terms of representational content currently cannot explain counter-examples that involve indeterminate perceptual content, such as in the case of objects seen blurrily by someone with poor eyesight, or objects seen vaguely in misty conditions. But this problem can be resolved via provision of a more sophisticated double content (DC) view, according to which the representational content of perception is structured in two nested levels. I start by outlining the DC view via consideration of four closely related cases of perceptual imprecision. Then, after a demonstration that the DC view can also explain imprecise photographic content, inadequacies in the more standard single content (SC) view are demonstrated. The results are then generalized so as to apply to the content of any kinds of non-conventional representation. The paper continues with evidence that a DC account provides a moderate rather than extreme realist account of perception, and it concludes with an initial analysis of the failure of nomic covariance accounts of information in indeterminacy cases.
Keywords Philosophy   Artificial Intelligence   Philosophy of Mind   Interdisciplinary Studies   Phenomenology
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-007-9050-6
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What is a Law of Nature?D. M. Armstrong - 1983 - Cambridge University Press.
A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O'Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Vague Objects.Michael Tye - 1990 - Mind 99 (396):535-557.

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