The double content of perception

Synthese 146 (3):225-243 (2005)
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Abstract

Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y?(X?) must be.

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John Dilworth
Western Michigan University

Citations of this work

The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
Perception and observation unladened.Ioannis Votsis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):563-585.
Representationalism and indeterminate perceptual content.John Dilworth - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
In support of content theories of art.John Dilworth - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):19 – 39.

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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

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