Synthese 146 (3):225-243 (2005)

Authors
John Dilworth
Western Michigan University
Abstract
Clearly we can perceive both objects, and various aspects or appearances of those objects. But how should that complexity of perceptual content be explained or analyzed? I argue that perceptual representations normally have a double or two level nested structure of content, so as to adequately incorporate information both about contextual aspects Y(X) of an object X, and about the object X itself. On this double content (DC) view, perceptual processing starts with aspectual data Y?(X?) as a higher level of content, which data does not itself provide lower level X-related content, but only an aspectually encoded form of such data. Hence the relevant perceptual data Y?(X?) must be.
Keywords Content  Data  Epistemology  Perception  Representation
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-004-6209-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

The Cognitive Impenetrability of Perception and Theory-Ladenness.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):87-103.
Perception and Observation Unladened.Ioannis Votsis - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):563-585.
Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content.John Dilworth - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
In Support of Content Theories of Art.John Dilworth - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):19 – 39.

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