Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2005-2015 (2018)

Authors
Abstract
A powerful objection to subject-sensitive invariantism concerns various ‘strange-but-true’ conditionals. One popular response to this objection is to argue that strange-but-true conditionals pose a problem for non-sceptical epistemological theories in general. In the present paper, it is argued that strange-but-true conditionals are not a problem for contextualism about ‘know’. This observation undercuts the proposed defence of SSI, and supplies a surprising new argument for contextualism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0947-9
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 61,025
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 39 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Knowledge, Context, and the Agent's Point of View.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 91--114.
Epistemological Contextualism.N. Vassallo - 2001 - Filosofia 52 (1):61-88.
Interests Contextualism.Robin McKenna - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.
Antiskeptical Conditionals.Theodore J. Everett - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):505–536.
What's Wrong with Contextualism?John Greco - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416-436.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-06-29

Total views
80 ( #130,894 of 2,439,542 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,107 of 2,439,542 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes