Abstracta (2):41-59 (2013)

Authors
Ezio Di Nucci
University of Copenhagen
Abstract
I argue that we should give up the fight to rescue causal theories of action from fundamental challenges such as the problem of deviant causal chains; and that we should rather pursue an account of action based on the basic intuition that control identifies agency. In Section 1 I introduce causalism about action explanation. In Section 2 I present an alternative, Frankfurt’s idea of guidance. In Section 3 I argue that the problem of deviant causal chains challenges causalism in two important respects: first, it emphasizes that causalism fails to do justice to our basic intuition that control is necessary for agency. Second, it provides countless counterexamples to causalism, which many recent firemen have failed to extinguish – as I argue in some detail. Finally, in Section 4 I argue, contra Al Mele, that control does not require the attribution of psychological states as causes.
Keywords action  deviance  guidance  intentional action  causalism  Davidson  Frankfurt  agency  control  intention
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2013
ISBN(s)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

View all 68 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Know-How as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Aristotle and Double Effect.Ezio Di Nucci - 2014 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 8 (1):20.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Automatic Actions: Challenging Causalism.Ezio Di Nucci - 2011 - Rationality Markets and Morals 2 (1):179-200.
Causalism and Intentional Omission.Joshua Shepherd - 2014 - American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):15-26.
Deviance and Causalism.Lilian O'Brien - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):175-196.
Passive Action and Causalism.Jing Zhu - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (3):295-314.
Basic Deviance Reconsidered.Markus E. Schlosser - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):186–194.
Frankfurt Versus Frankfurt: A New Anti-Causalist Dawn.Ezio Di Nucci - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):117-131.
Nondeviant Chains in Intentional Action.Robert K. Shope - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:15-49.
The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.
Agency.A. P. Simester - 1996 - Law and Philosophy 15 (2):159 - 181.
Two Dogmas of Contemporary Philosophy of Action.Giuseppina D'Oro - 2007 - Journal of the Philosophy of History 1 (1):10-24.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-11-23

Total views
1,052 ( #4,124 of 2,421,440 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
46 ( #17,525 of 2,421,440 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes