Degrees of Acceptance

Philosophical Quarterly (3):578-594 (2022)
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Abstract

While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptance comes in degrees and acknowledging this helps to resolve problems in at least two philosophical domains. Degrees of acceptance play vital roles when we simplify our reasoning, and they ground the common ground of a conversation if we assume context probabilism, i.e., that the common ground must be represented with probability spaces rather than possible worlds.

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Alexander Dinges
Humboldt University, Berlin

Citations of this work

On proper presupposition.Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (2):338-359.
Assertion and Certainty.Alexander Dinges - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):169-186.

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References found in this work

Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.
Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
Common ground.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.

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