Synthese 191 (15):3541-3556 (2014)

Alexander Dinges
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
It has been argued that epistemic contextualism faces the so-called factivity problem and hence cannot be stated properly. The basic idea behind this charge is that contextualists supposedly have to say, on the one hand, that knowledge ascribing sentences like “S knows that S has hands” are true when used in ordinary contexts while, on the other hand, they are not true by the standard of their own context. In my paper, I want to show that the argument to the factivity problem fails because it rests on the mistaken premise that contextualists are committed to the truth of particular ordinary knowledge attributions
Keywords Factivity problem  Knowledge norm of assertion   Epistemic contextualism  Knowability problem
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-014-0459-5
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John P. Hawthorn - 2003 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - Oxford University Press.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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