Innocent implicatures

Journal of Pragmatics 87:54-63 (2015)
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Abstract

It seems to be a common and intuitively plausible assumption that conversational implicatures arise only when one of the so-called conversational maxims is violated at the level of what is said. The basic idea behind this thesis is that, unless a maxim is violated at the level of what is said, nothing can trigger the search for an implicature. Thus, non-violating implicatures wouldn’t be calculable. This paper defends the view that some conversational implicatures arise even though no conversational maxim is violated at the level of what is said.

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Alexander Dinges
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Citations of this work

Non-literal Lies.Emanuel Viebahn - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1367-1380.
Assertions in Fictions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (3):445-462.
What does it take to tell a lie?Emanuel Viebahn - forthcoming - In Alex Wiegmann (ed.), Lying, Fake News, and Bullshit. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 1-24.
Knowledge, intuition and implicature.Alexander Dinges - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2821-2843.

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References found in this work

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.
Conversational Impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.
Conversational impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 284.

View all 13 references / Add more references