Knowledge and availability

Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573 (2018)
Authors
Alexander Dinges
Universität Hamburg
Abstract
The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.
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Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2018.1438594
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Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.

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