Knowledge and availability

Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):554-573 (2018)
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Abstract

The mentioning of error-possibilities makes us less likely to ascribe knowledge. This paper offers a novel psychological account of this data. The account appeals to “subadditivity,” a well-known psychological tendency to judge possibilities as more likely when they are disjunctively described.

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Alexander Dinges
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

Citations of this work

Much at stake in knowledge.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (5):729-749.
Salient Alternatives in Perspective.Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, Joshua Alexander & John P. Waterman - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):792-810.
Knowledge and cancelability.Tammo Lossau - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):397-405.
On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.

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References found in this work

Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
The least discerning and most promiscuous truthmaker.Jonathan Schaffer - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):307 - 324.

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