Knowledge, Stakes and Error: A Psychological Account

Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Klostermann (2019)

Authors
Alexander Dinges
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Abstract
The term “know” is one of the ten most common verbs in English, and yet a central aspect of its usage remains mysterious. Our willingness to ascribe knowledge depends not just on epistemic factors such as the quality of our evidence. It also depends on seemingly non-epistemic factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once our attention is drawn to possible sources of error. Accounts of this phenomenon proliferate, but no consensus has been achieved, decades of research notwithstanding. Alexander Dinges offers a fresh examination of this ongoing debate. After reviewing and complementing relevant data from both armchair and experimental philosophy, he assesses extant accounts of this data including semantic, metaphysical, pragmatic, doxastic as well as more recent psychological accounts. Against this background, he offers a novel psychological account based on the idea that non-epistemic factors affect estimates of probability.
Keywords knowledge ascriptions  stakes effects  salience effects  pragmatic encroachment  epistemic contextualism  experimental epistemology  experimental philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 3465043979
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 52,956
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Knowledge and Cancelability.Tammo Lossau - forthcoming - Synthese:1-9.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Testing What’s at Stake: Defending Stakes Effects for Testimony.Michel Croce & Paul Poenicke - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):163-183.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Intrusión pragmática y valor epistémico.Pascal Engel - 2011 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 23 (1):25-51.
Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn B. Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.
Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.
Knowledge, Certainty, and Skepticism: A Cross-Cultural Study.John Philip Waterman, Chad Gonnerman, Karen Yan & Joshua Alexander - 2018 - In Stephen Stich, Masaharu Mizumoto & Eric McCready (eds.), Epistemology for the rest of the world. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-214.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-287.
Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-05-20

Total views
1 ( #1,427,873 of 2,343,895 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #514,299 of 2,343,895 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

My notes