Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability


Authors
Yifeng Ding
University of California, Berkeley
Wesley H. Holliday
University of California, Berkeley
Thomas Icard
Stanford University
Abstract
This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures.
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