Mind and Language:1-21 (2020)

Authors
Alexander Dinges
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Julia Zakkou
Freie Universität Berlin
Abstract
Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects . But practical factor effects turn out to be hard to confirm in experimental studies, and where they have been confirmed, they may seem easy to explain away. We suggest a novel experimental paradigm to show that practical factor effects exist. It trades on the idea that people retract knowledge attributions when practical factors shift. We also explain why the resulting data raise a serious challenge to orthodoxy.
Keywords experimental epistemology  knowledge ascriptions  pragmatic encroachment  retraction  salient alternative effects  stakes effects
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/mila.12300
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,447
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Knowledge, Stakes and Error: A Psychological Account.Alexander Dinges - 2019 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Klostermann.
Testing What’s at Stake: Defending Stakes Effects for Testimony.Michel Croce & Paul Poenicke - 2017 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):163-183.
Against Pragmatic Encroachment.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (1):77-85.
How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
Pragmatic Encroachment, Stakes, and Religious Knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):217-229.
Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism.Kathryn Francis, Philip Beaman & Nat Hansen - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:427--487.
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Feminist Epistemology.Robin McKenna - forthcoming - In Natalie Alana Ashton, Martin Kusch, Robin McKenna & Katharina Sodoma (eds.), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Relativism. Routledge.
Pragmatic Encroachment and Theistic Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-287.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-06-08

Total views
27 ( #359,724 of 2,326,356 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #24,194 of 2,326,356 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes