Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):730-740 (2017)

Authors
Alexander Dinges
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Abstract
Relativism entails that sentences like ‘Liquorice is tasty’ are used to assert relativistic propositions—that is, propositions whose truth-value is relative to a taste standard. I will defend this view against two objections. According to the first objection, relativism is incompatible with a Stalnakerian account of assertion. I will show that this objection fails because Stalnakerian assertions are proposals rather than attempts to update the common ground. According to the second objection, relativism problematically predicts that we can correctly assess beliefs as false but faultless. I will show that it doesn't. Such assessments come out as incorrect because correct relativistic assertion requires the absence of a presupposition of non-commonality.
Keywords relativism  assertion  commonality
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1284248
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References found in this work BETA

Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Relativism and Monadic Truth.Herman Cappelen & John Hawthorne - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
Common Ground.Robert C. Stalnaker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (5-6):701-721.
When Truth Gives Out.Mark Richard - 2008 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Relativism.Maria Baghramian & Adam J. Carter - 2020 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (27):1-22.
Relativism.Chris Swoyer - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relativism, Disagreement and Testimony.Alexander Dinges - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):497-519.
Objectivity and Perspectival Content.Max Kölbel - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

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