Situating the self: understanding the effects of deep brain stimulation

Abstract

The article proposes a theoretical model to account for changes in self due to Deep Brain Stimulation. First, we argue that most existing models postulate a very narrow conception of self, and thus fail to capture the full range of potentially relevant DBS-induced changes. Second, building on previous work by Shaun Gallagher, we propose a modified ‘pattern-theory of self’, which provides a richer picture of the possible consequences of DBS treatment.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,879

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-21

Downloads
68 (#172,494)

6 months
1 (#386,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Roy Dings
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

References found in this work

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 11 (3):506-507.

View all 29 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

The Gold-Plated Leucotomy Standard and Deep Brain Stimulation.Grant Gillett - 2011 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (1):35-44.
Stimulating Brains, Altering Minds.W. Glannon - 2009 - Journal of Medical Ethics 35 (5):289-292.