Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (2):221 – 229 (2000)
Environmental ethics is generally searching for the intrinsic value in natural beings. However, there are very few holistic models trying to reflect the various dimensions of the experience-to-be a natural being. We are searching for that intrinsic value, in order to determine which species are holders of rights. In this article, I suggest a set of moral and rational principles to be used for identifying the intrinsic value of a given species and for comparing it to that of other species.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Case for Animal Rights.Tom Regan - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press. pp. 425-434.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Human Enhancement and Supra-Personal Moral Status.Thomas Douglas - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):473-497.
Intrinsic Value and Direct Duties: From Animal Ethics Towards Environmental Ethics? [REVIEW]Robert Heeger & Frans W. A. Brom - 2001 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 14 (2):241-252.
Why There is No Evidence for the Intrinsic Value of Non-Humans.Toby Svoboda - 2011 - Ethics and the Environment 16 (2):25-36.
Toward the Moral Considerability of Species and Ecosystems.Lawrence E. Johnson - 1992 - Environmental Ethics 14 (2):145-157.
Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species.Rick O'Neil - 1997 - Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads82 ( #60,501 of 2,143,511 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #185,644 of 2,143,511 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.