Agnosticism about other worlds: A new antirealist programme in modality

Abstract
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy
Keywords agnosticism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00522.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 27,220
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Spreading the Word.Simon Blackburn - 1984 - Clarendon Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Quinean Scepticism About de Re Modality After David Lewis.John Divers - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):40–62.
Is Everything A World?Josh Parsons - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.
Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
Epistemological Objections to Platonism.David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):67-77.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

93 ( #55,085 of 2,164,583 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #84,058 of 2,164,583 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums