Agnosticism about other worlds: A new antirealist programme in modality


Authors
John Divers
University of Leeds
Abstract
The modal antirealist, as presented here, aims to secure at least some of the benefits associated with talking in genuine modal realist terms while avoiding commitment to a plurality of Lewisian (or ersatz) worlds. The antirealist stance of agnosticism about other worlds combines acceptance of Lewis's account of what world-talk means with refusal to assert, or believe in, the existence of other worlds. Agnosticism about other worlds does not entail a comprehensive agnosticism about modality, but where such agnosticism about modality is enforced, the aim of the agnostic programme is to show that it is not detrimental to our modal practices. The agnostic programme consists in an attempt to demonstrate the rational dispensability of that disputed class of modal beliefs which the agnostic eschews, but which are held by the realist and the folk. Here I attempt to motivate, describe, and illustrate such an agnostic antirealist programme in modal philosophy
Keywords agnosticism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00522.x
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA

Epistemological Objections to Platonism.David Liggins - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (1):67-77.
Quinean Scepticism About de Re Modality After David Lewis.John Divers - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):40–62.
Why Modal Fictionalism is Not Self-Defeating.Richard Woodward - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):273 - 288.
Is Everything A World?Josh Parsons - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.

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