An inconvenient modal truth

Analysis 74 (4):575-577 (2014)
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Abstract

There is a de re modal truth that proves inconvenient for the canonical Lewisian theory of modality. For this truth requires on that theory, the existence of things (counterparts) that exist in distinct worlds but are also spatiotemporally related

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John Divers
Trinity College, Dublin

Citations of this work

Cross-World Comparatives for Modal Realists.Robert Michels - 2018 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (3):368-391.
Fragmentalism and Tensed Truths.Xiaochen Qi - 2025 - Acta Analytica 40 (1).

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
On The Plurality of Worlds.Graeme Forbes - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (151):222-240.
Counterparts of persons and their bodies.David Lewis - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (7):203-211.

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