Abstract

Central to Rawls's theory of justice is his focus on institutions as the primary subject of justice. His two principles of justice, which seek to guarantee basic liberties and to ensure that social and economic inequality is eliminated except to the extent it benefits all citizens, apply directly only to major social institutions, which set the ground rules of society. We set these rules by their ability to produce the results described in the two principles. Individuals, rather than being subject to these principles directly, are for the most part simply required instead to comply with and support just institutions, but are not viewed as responsible for lessening social inequality, or for directly promoting any of the aims of the principles of justice themselves. This division between principles for institutions and principles for individuals has recently been challenged by a number of authors---a set of challenges that has provoked a number of responses. Most of the recent discussion has been focused on those who argue that the egalitarianism Rawls demands of just institutions ought to be extended to govern individual conduct within such institutions. I respond to these criticisms, focusing on challenges by G. A. Cohen and Liam Murphy. Before addressing their positions, I attempt to clarify the structure of Rawls's institutional focus, by following the development of his early thought on institutions and social practices. With that background in place, I argue that Cohen and Murphy misconstrue the way principles of institutions and individuals work in a view like Rawls's. I conclude that any such attack needs to address the substance of the basic building blocks of Rawls's theory. Finally, I present an outline of why Rawls's view ends up having the institutionally focused structure that it has, by connecting his idea of society as a fair system of mutual cooperation among free and equal people with the idea of the basic structure of society and our responsibilities with respect to it