Manifesting belief in absolute necessity

Philosophical Studies 158 (1):109-130 (2012)
Abstract
McFetridge (in Logical necessity and other essays . London: Blackwell, 1990 ) suggests that to treat a proposition as logically necessary—to believe a proposition logically necessary, and to manifest that belief—is a matter of preparedness to deploy that proposition as a premise in reasoning from any supposition. We consider whether a suggestion in that spirit can be generalized to cover all cases of absolute necessity, both logical and non-logical, and we conclude that it can. In Sect. 2, we explain the significance that such an account of manifestation of belief in absolute necessity has for the prospects of a non-realist theory of modality. In Sect. 3, we offer a sympathetic articulation of the detail that underlies the McFetridge conception of belief in logical necessity. In Sects. 4 and 5, we show that the conception so articulated will not generalize to encompass all cases of belief in absolute necessity and proceed to offer a remedy. Our proposal is based upon a distinction between two kinds of suppositional act: A-supposing and C-supposing (Sect. 6). In Sect. 7, we then explain and defend our central thesis: (roughly) that (manifestation of) belief in absolute necessity is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any C-supposition. Finally, we indicate that there is some promise in the parallel thesis that manifestation of the treatment of a proposition as a priori is a matter of preparedness to deploy as a premise in reasoning under any A-supposition (Sect. 8)
Keywords Necessity  Modality  Modal belief  Modal anti-realism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9674-1
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,628
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Wither Metaphysical Necessity?John Divers - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):1-25.
The Extent of Metaphysical Necessity.Daniel Nolan - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):313-339.
Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & José Edgar González‐Varela - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):358-391.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Belief in Absolute Necessity.John Divers & José Edgar González‐Varela - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):358-391.
Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity.Bob Hale - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (1):1–20.
On the Reduction of Necessity to Essence.Fabrice Correia - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):639-653.
Possible Ideas of Necessity in Indian Logic.Sundar Sarukkai - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (5):563-582.
The Grounds of Necessity.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (4):348-358.
The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or a Posteriori Necessity?Kathrin Glüer - 2006 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):337 – 359.
Added to PP index
2010-12-21

Total downloads
183 ( #29,076 of 2,236,103 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #148,981 of 2,236,103 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature