Savulescu's objections to the future of value argument

Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2):119-122 (2005)
This essay is a response to Julian Savulescu’s objections to the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2002. Firstly, Savulescu’s claim that the future of value argument has implausible implications is considered. The author argues that the argument does not have these implications. Secondly, properties which, according to Savulescu, could underwrite the wrongness of killing and that are acquired only after implantation, are considered. It is argued that none of these properties is an adequate basis for the distinction between wrongful and permissible killing
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DOI 10.1136/jme.2004.007633
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