Putnam's model-theoretic argument(s). A detailed reconstruction

Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed critically.
Keywords antirealism  metaphysical realism  mathematicalrealism  model-theoretic argument  Skolem-Paradox
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1008369914990
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,071
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

98 ( #52,164 of 2,171,689 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #173,816 of 2,171,689 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums