The self as an embedded agent

Minds and Machines 13 (2):187-201 (2003)
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Abstract

  In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a six point definition of embeddedness, constituting minimal conditions for the evolution of a sense of self. This leads to further analysis of the nature of embodiment and situatedness, and a consideration of whether virtual animats in virtual worlds could count as situated and embodied. We propose that self-aware agents must possess complex structures of self-directed goals; multi-modal sensory systems and a rich repertoire of interactions with their worlds. Finally, we argue that embedded agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, relative to their current positions in space and time, and have a capacity to develop an egocentric space. None of these capabilities are possible without powerful internal representational capacities

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2009-01-28

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Susan Stuart
University of Glasgow

Citations of this work

Knowledge Generation as Natural Computation.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2008 - Journal of Systemics, Cybernetics and Informatics 6 (2).
Enkinaesthesia: The Fundamental Challenge for Machine Consciousness.S. A. J. Stuart - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (1):145-162.
Conscious Machines: Memory, Melody and Muscular Imagination. [REVIEW]Susan A. J. Stuart - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):37-51.
A Metaphysical Approach to the Mind.Susan Stuart - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):223-37.

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References found in this work

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Intelligence Without Representation.Rodney A. Brooks - 1991 - Artificial Intelligence 47 (1--3):139-159.
The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
Mind Embodied and Embedded.John Haugeland - 1993 - In Yu-Houng H. Houng & J. Ho (eds.), Mind and Cognition: 1993 International Symposium. Academica Sinica. pp. 233-267.

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