Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685 (2011)
In this paper I argue for a doctrine I call ?infallibilism?, which I stipulate to mean that If S knows that p, then the epistemic probability of p for S is 1. Some fallibilists will claim that this doctrine should be rejected because it leads to scepticism. Though it's not obvious that infallibilism does lead to scepticism, I argue that we should be willing to accept it even if it does. Infallibilism should be preferred because it has greater explanatory power than fallibilism. In particular, I argue that an infallibilist can easily explain why assertions of ?p, but possibly not-p? (where the ?possibly? is read as referring to epistemic possibility) is infelicitous in terms of the knowledge rule of assertion. But a fallibilist cannot. Furthermore, an infallibilist can explain the infelicity of utterances of ?p, but I don't know that p? and ?p might be true, but I'm not willing to say that for all I know, p is true?, and why when a speaker thinks p is epistemically possible for her, she will agree (if asked) that for all she knows, p is true. The simplest explanation of these facts entails infallibilism. Fallibilists have tried and failed to explain the infelicity of ?p, but I don't know that p?, but have not even attempted to explain the last two facts. I close by considering two facts that seem to pose a problem for infallibilism, and argue that they don't
|Keywords||knowledge attributions epistemic modals skepticism fallibilism contextualism knowledge epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.
Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
The Gettier Illusion, the Tripartite Analysis, and the Divorce Thesis.Anthony Robert Booth - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):625-638.
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