Defending the Discovery Model in the Ontology of Art: A Reply to Amie Thomasson on the Qua Problem

British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (1):75-95 (2012)

Authors
Julian Dodd
University of Manchester
Abstract
According to the discovery model in the ontology of art, the facts concerning the ontological status of artworks are mind-independent and, hence, are facts about which the folk may be substantially ignorant or in error. In recent work Amie Thomasson has claimed that the most promising solution to the ‘ qua problem’—a problem concerning how the reference of a referring-expression is fixed—requires us to give up the discovery model. I argue that this claim is false. Thomasson's solution to the qua problem—a hybrid descriptive/causal theory of reference-fixing—has a superior competitor, in the form of the account of reference-fixing suggested by Gareth Evans; and Evans's theory leaves the discovery model untouched
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/aesthj/ayr047
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,665
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Ontologia da Arte.António Lopes - 2013 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
Descriptivism and Its Discontents.David Davies - 2017 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 75 (2):117-129.
Musical Perdurantism and the Problem of Intermittent Existence.Alexey Aliyev - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):83-100.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Ontology of Art and Knowledge in Aesthetics.Amie L. Thomasson - 2005 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 63 (3):221–229.
Ontological Innovation in Art.Amie L. Thomasson - 2010 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (2):119-130.
Metaphysical Arguments Against Ordinary Objects.Amie Thomasson - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):340 - 359.
Comment on Amie Thomasson's "Self-Awareness and Self-Knowledge".Victor Caston - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
Real Natures and Familiar Objects. [REVIEW]Amie L. Thomasson - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2):518–523.
Roman Ingarden.Amie Thomasson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Finite Axiomatizability and Scientific Discovery.Daniel N. Osherson & Scott Weinstein - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:409 - 412.
Where is Sherlock Holmes?Jeffrey Goodman - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):183-197.
Realism and Human Kinds.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):580–609.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-01-14

Total views
73 ( #105,170 of 2,242,756 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #401,508 of 2,242,756 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature