Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):69–85 (2001)
This paper asks whether we should accept a weakened version of the truthmaker principle: namely, the claim that truth supervenes on being, in which 'being' is understood as whether things are. I consider a number of positive answers to this question, including the following: that the truthmaker principle is a requirement of any plausible explanation of truth; that the principle must be accepted, if we are to do justice to the Wittgensteinian insight that the world is the totality of facts, not of things; and that the correctness of the principle is a necessary condition of a realist metaphysics. In my view, none of these attempts to motivate the truthmaker principle is satisfactory
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Truthmakers and the Groundedness of Truth.David Liggins - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (2):177-196.
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