Roger White's Argument against Imprecise Credences

Abstract
According to the Imprecise Credence Framework (ICF), a rational believer's doxastic state should be modelled by a set of probability functions rather than a single probability function, namely, the set of probability functions allowed by the evidence ( Joyce [2005] ). Roger White ( [2010] ) has recently given an arresting argument against the ICF, which has garnered a number of responses. In this article, I attempt to cast doubt on his argument. First, I point out that it's not an argument against the ICF per se , but an argument for the Principle of Indifference. Second, I present an argument that's analogous to White's. I argue that if White's premises are true, the premises of this argument are too. But the premises of my argument entail something obviously false. Therefore, White's premises must not all be true
Keywords probability  imprecise probability  credence  degree of belief  formal epistemology  Bayesianism  Bertrand's Paradox  Principle of Indifference
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axs014
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References found in this work BETA
How Probabilities Reflect Evidence.James M. Joyce - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):153–178.
A Puzzle About Ineffable Propositions.Agustín Rayo - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):289 - 295.

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In Defence of Dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.
Intuitive Dilation?Casey Hart & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):252-262.

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