Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649 (2007)
Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is 1. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic.
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References found in this work BETA
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
``Skepticism and Closure: Why the Evil Genius Argument Fails".Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213--236.
Citations of this work BETA
Thinking Animals, Disagreement, and Skepticism.Eric Yang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):109-121.
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