Deductive completeness

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 2 (3):243-283 (1996)
Abstract
This is an exposition of Lambek's strengthening and generalization of the deduction theorem in categories related to intuitionistic propositional logic. Essential notions of category theory are introduced so as to yield a simple reformulation of Lambek's Functional Completeness Theorem, from which its main consequences can be readily drawn. The connections of the theorem with combinatory logic, and with modal and substructural logics, are briefly considered at the end
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DOI 10.2307/420991
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References found in this work BETA
Functional Completeness of Cartesian Categories.J. Lambek - 1974 - Annals of Mathematical Logic 6 (3-4):259-292.

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Citations of this work BETA
Models of Deduction.Kosta Dosen - 2006 - Synthese 148 (3):639-657.
Coherence in SMCCs and Equivalences on Derivations in IMLL with Unit.L. Mehats & Sergei Soloviev - 2007 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 147 (3):127-179.

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