An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147 (2016)
Authors
Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin
Sophie Horowitz
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness.
Keywords Uniqueness  Permissivism  Epistemic Evaluation  Pragmatic
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12078
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.
Epistemic Permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.

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Citations of this work BETA

Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Mind:fzy044.
Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

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