Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):179-186 (2018)

Luke Roelofs
New York University
Tobias Schlicht
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Krzysztof (Krys) Dolega
Ruhr-Universität Bochum (PhD)
The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume.
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DOI 10.1080/13869795.2018.1479440
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Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.

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