Intuitions for inferences

Philosophical Studies 165 (2):371-399 (2013)
In this paper, I explore a question about deductive reasoning: why am I in a position to immediately infer some deductive consequences of what I know, but not others? I show why the question cannot be answered in the most natural ways of answering it, in particular in Descartes’s way of answering it. I then go on to introduce a new approach to answering the question, an approach inspired by Hume’s view of inductive reasoning
Keywords Deductive reasoning  Suppositional reasoning  Intuition  Conditional intuition  Descartes  Hume
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9955-y
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PhilPapers Archive Sinan Dogramaci, Intuitions for inferences
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