Knowing our degrees of belief

Episteme 13 (3):269-287 (2016)
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Abstract

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it.

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Author's Profile

Sinan Dogramaci
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-21.
A New Puzzle About Belief and Credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.
Perception and Probability.Alex Byrne - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):343-363.
A Representation Theorem for Frequently Irrational Agents.Edward Elliott - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (5):467-506.

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References found in this work

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.

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