Why Leibniz thinks Descartes was wrong and the Scholastics were right

Philosophical Studies 149 (1):1-18 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Leibniz believes that if there are corporeal substances, they have substantial forms, believes there are substantial forms, and believes there is a close connection between the first two claims. Why does he believe there is this close connection? This paper answers that question and draws out its bearing on the realism/idealism debate.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 96,272

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Leibniz on Corporeal Substance.Peeter Müürsepp - 2016 - Acta Baltica Historiae Et Philosophiae Scientiarum 4 (2):31-52.
Leibniz and the Fardella Memo.Shane Duarte - 2009 - Studia Leibnitiana 41 (1):67-87.
Corporeal Substance.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1994 - In Adams Robert Merrihew (ed.), Leibniz: determinist, theist, idealist. New York: Oxford University Press.
Leibnizian Idealism.Craig Warmke - 2021 - In Joshua R. Farris & Benedikt Paul Göcke (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Idealism and Immaterialism. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 167-178.
Corporeal Substances and True Unities.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1995 - Studia Leibnitiana 27 (2):157.
Form and Matter in Leibniz's Middle Years.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1994 - In Adams Robert Merrihew (ed.), Leibniz: determinist, theist, idealist. New York: Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-03-31

Downloads
69 (#249,760)

6 months
12 (#449,218)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tyler Doggett
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

The Logic of Leibniz’s Borrowed Reality Argument.Stephen Puryear - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):350-370.

Add more citations