Philosophical Studies 149 (1):1-18 (2010)

Authors
Tyler Doggett
University of Vermont
Abstract
Leibniz believes that if there are corporeal substances, they have substantial forms, believes there are substantial forms, and believes there is a close connection between the first two claims. Why does he believe there is this close connection? This paper answers that question and draws out its bearing on the realism/idealism debate.
Keywords Leibniz  Realism  Idealism  Corporeal substance  Levey
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9537-9
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References found in this work BETA

Leibniz: An Introduction.C. D. Broad - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Logic of Leibniz’s Borrowed Reality Argument.Stephen Puryear - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):350-370.

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