DeRose on the conditionals of deliberation

Authors
Daniel Dohrn
Humboldt-University, Berlin
Abstract
I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis of counterfactuals with the contextual relevance of the corresponding indicative conditionals.
Keywords DeRose  Deliberations  Conditionals  Counterfactuals  Gibbard cases  backtracking
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