The model-theoretic argument known as Putnam´s paradox threatens our notion of truth with triviality: Almost any world can satisfy almost any theory. Formal argument and intuition are at odds. David Lewis devised a solution according to which the very stucture of the world fixes how it is to be divided into elite classes which determine the reference of any true theory. Three claims are defended: Firstly, Lewis´ proposal must be completed by an account of successful referential intentions. Secondly, contrary to Catherine Elgin´s criticism of Lewis, natural properties corresponding to elite classes may play a role in sound scientific inquiry. Thirdly, despite Bas van Fraassen´s objection that the sceptic cannot consistently maintain doubts about reference, there is a promising sceptical strategy of exploiting Putnam´s results which is answered by Lewis´ account.
|Keywords||Lewis semantics Putnam natural van Fraassen Putnam's paradox reference magnetism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Van Fraassen's Dissolution of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument.Mathias Frisch - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (1):158-164.
Putnam's Paradox: Metaphysical Realism Revamped and Evaded.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11 (s11):17-42.
Added to index2009-06-28
Total downloads100 ( #50,317 of 2,164,296 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #128,955 of 2,164,296 )
How can I increase my downloads?