Res Philosophica 91 (2):241-259 (2014)

Authors
Jérôme Dokic
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Aristotle famously claimed that we perceive that we see or hear, and that this metaperception necessarily accompanies all conscious sensory experiences. In this essay I compare Aristotle’s account of metaperception with three main models of self-awareness to be found in the contemporary literature. The first model countenances introspection or inner sense as higher-order perception. The second model rejects introspection altogether, and maintains that judgments that we see or hear can be directly extracted from the first-order experience, using a procedure sometimes called “an ascent routine.” The third model insists that the first-order experience has a twofold intentional structure: it is directed both at the perceived external object and at itself, i.e., reflexively. Although Aristotle’s own account is certainly closer to the third model , the latter does not exhaust Aristotle’s insights on metaperception. One function of the common sense in Aristotle’s theory of perception is apparently to monitor the activity of our sensory modalities, and to make us aware that we see or hear independently of the sensory contents of our experience. I shall suggest that the monitoring function of perception is best understood in relation with contemporary cognitive science research on metacognition. Common sense is or involves a metaperceptual practical ability distinct from both object level sensory perception and metarepresentational knowledge about our senses
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.11612/resphil.2014.91.2.3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,447
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mirrors and Misleading Appearances.Vivian Mizrahi - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):354-367.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Aristotle on the Common Sense.Pavel Gregoric - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
The Phenomenal Character of Experience.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):291-314.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
Aristotle on the Sense Organs (Review). [REVIEW]J. A. Towey - 1999 - Journal of Hellenic Studies 119:192-193.
Descartes on the Cognitive Structure of Sensory Experience.Alison Simmons - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (3):549–579.
Aristotle on Common Perception.Laura Papish - 2014 - Apeiron 47 (3):342-55.
Inner-Sense.Vincent Picciuto & Peter Carruthers - forthcoming - In Biggs S., Matthen M. & Stokes D. (eds.), Perception and its Modalites. Oxford University Press.
Perception and Its Modalities.Dustin Stokes, Mohan Matthen & Stephen Biggs (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Aristotle on Odour and Smell.Mark A. Johnstone - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 43:143-83.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-01-31

Total views
42 ( #223,120 of 2,326,357 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #283,481 of 2,326,357 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes