The ontology of perception: Bipolarity and content

Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69 (1998)
Abstract
The notion of perceptual content is commonly introduced in the analysis of perception. It stems from an analogy between perception and propositional attitudes. Both kinds of mental states, it is thought, have conditions of satisfaction. I try to show that on the most plausible account of perceptual content, it does not determine the conditions under which perceptual experience is veridical. Moreover, perceptual content must be bipolar (capable of being correct and capable of being incorrect), whereas perception as a mental state is not (if it is veridical, it is essentially so). This has profound consequences for the epistemological view that perception is a source of knowledge. I sktech a two-level epistemology which is consistent with this view. I conclude that the analogy between perception and propositional attitudes, from which the notion of perceptual content is born, may be more misleading than it is usually thought
Keywords Content  Knowledge  Metaphysics  Perception  Propositional Attitudes
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1005340005731
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 26,162
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Is There a Problem About Nonconceptual Content?Jeff Speaks - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (3):359-98.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. pp. 481--503.
The Twofold Orientational Structure of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):187-203.
Levels of Perceptual Content.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2000 - Philsophical Studies 100 (3):237-54.
The Double Content of Perception.John Dilworth - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):225-243.
Perception and Content.Bill Brewer - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (2):165-181.
Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?Tim Crane - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):452-469.
Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience.Martin Davies - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66:21-45.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

183 ( #23,500 of 2,152,250 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

6 ( #119,603 of 2,152,250 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums