Abstract

I argue that two theses, which get conflated tacitly but frequently in both the philosophical and the scientific literature on perception, must be distinguished. The first is that there are optimal viewpoints, viewpoints from which an object’s shape is more readily discernable than from others. The second is that there are privileged viewpoints, viewpoints that alone secure the veridicality of perception. I claim that phenomenology establishes the ubiquitousness of optimal viewpoints, but that the notion of privileged viewpoints is indefensible. It emerges when the empirical investigation of the mechanism of perception, and specifically of the role of retinal images, becomes the basis for the phenomenology of perception. Both the notion of a privileged viewpoint and the models it serves, such as the two-step model, are, I argue, untenable. To emphasize: the claims are phenomenological, not empirical, and so cannot be confirmed or refuted by empirical evidence. Optimal viewpoints are further explored by critically examining Husserl’s notion of a “sum of optima” and assessing it in the context of his claim that normal viewpoints are optimal. The paper ends with some thoughts on what the relationship between the science and the phenomenology of vision ought to be.