Some thoughts about retributivism

Ethics 101 (3):537-559 (1991)
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Retributive accounts of the justification of criminal punishment are increasingly fashionable, yet their proponents frequently rely more on suggestive metaphor than on reasoned explanation. This article seeks to question whether any such coherent explanations are possible. I briefly sketch some general doubts about the validity of retributivist views and then critique three recent efforts (by George Sher, Jean Hampton, and Michael Moore) to put retributivism on a sound basis



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Citations of this work

Towards a Modest Legal Moralism.R. A. Duff - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):217-235.
Say what? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism.Nathan Hanna - 2008 - Law and Philosophy 27 (2):123-150.
Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.
Two grounds of liability.Victor Tadros - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3503-3522.
Standing to Punish the Disadvantaged.Benjamin S. Yost - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 17 (3):711-733.

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