This article reviews the enactive approach to perception, which defends the role of objects, the subject and the environment in the configuration of the phenomenal character of perception, that is, the qualitative dimension of experience. Initially the case of hallucination and its implications in the understanding of the phenomenal character of perception is retaken. Then, two positions within analytic philosophy of perception, representationalism and disjunctivism, are critically explored. Finally, enactivism is presented as a more promising alternative.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2020v24n1p29
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 51,508
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

No alquilarás tu vientre.[author unknown] - forthcoming - El Catoblepas: Revista Crítica Del Presente.
What is the Subjectivity of Perceptual Experience?Bosuk Yoon - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:215-222.
On the Particularity of Experience.Anil Gomes & Craig French - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):451-460.


Added to PP index

Total views
45 ( #208,666 of 2,330,902 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
45 ( #12,979 of 2,330,902 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes