Reference and the ambiguity of truth‐value judgments

Mind and Language 35 (4):440-455 (2019)
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Abstract

Martí argued that referential intuitions are not the right kind of empirical evidence for testing theories of reference. Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc replied with a survey aimed at providing evidence that referential intuitions are in sync with truth‐value judgments and argued that truth‐value judgments provide empirical data from linguistic usage. We present the results of a survey indicating that Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc's experiment fails to overcome Martí's objection: The truth‐value judgements tested by Machery, Olivola, and De Blanc do not provide data relevant for testing theories of reference.

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References found in this work

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Designation.Michael Devitt - 1981 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Philosophy 65 (251):111-113.

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